I'll admit to not having much experience with negative utilitarianism, but at a more meta level, I've become suspicious of motivations defined by what they are AGAINST rather than what they are FOR. I've noticed this in political movements especially: organizations that are to e.g. promote the welfare of immigrants seem far more strategic and effective than those that were just opposed to Trump's immigration laws.
Concepts like loss aversion and social pressure suggest that some people really are motivated by these ideas - Hank below seems to articulate this perspective well. But I have a feeling that outside of a few people whose brains are just well wired for it, most humans will be happier framing their life around what they are excited about, not about what they are afraid of. It's certainly advice I give to friends who seem to be stuck focused on negativity.
I think the counter-intuitive cases you present are troubling for negative hedonistic utilitarianism, but they seem less threatening for a anti-frustrastionist/negative preference utilitarian.
Ord's Examples:
(1) the gym, besides instrumental gains to health/wellbeing from exercise, many also want to be fit/muscly/etc. and working out gets them what they want. Not going to the gym would frustrate those preferences.
(2) nice food, people like nice food, not buying it would frustrate their preference for good cuisine. If someone only wanted to eat rice and beans, it would seem strange to give them caviar and say you improved their wellbeing imo.
(3) sprint for the bus to make it to the theatre, people want to see the beginning of plays. Not sprinting would frustrate that preference
(4) they read great books and listen to beautiful music, people want to experience quality recreation. Sitting in a silent, all-beige room would frustrate those preferences for fun/beauty.
And your examples:
(1) a play my friend would love, but that she otherwise wouldn’t have learned about. Assuming my friend likes to watch great plays, not telling her would frustrate her preferences. If she doesn't already want to see plays, then I don't think its counterintuitive not to tell her instead of suggesting recreation she already wants.
(2) Content with mediocre art until showed a piece of much, much more beautiful art. This might be a counter-example, assuming the former-mediocre-art-enjoyer had no preference for finer art until showed it. But it doesn't feel that counter-intuitive to me to say that a person whose content with their current tastes and would be discontent if you gave them higher tastes wouldn't benefit from getting higher tastes. And if they themselves wanted to become an art snob, not getting to do so would frustrate their preference.
(3) Status-seeker should go on a Napa Valley wine-tasting tour and wine-enjoyer shouldn’t. If the wine-enjoyer wants to go on the wine-tasting tour and the status-seeker doesn't, then the wine-enjoyer should go. if the preferences are reversed/status-seeker prefers to go more than wine-enjoyer, I think I endorse that the status-seeker should go instead.
(4) Children. If you want children, not having them would be preference frustration (although the consideration of the kid's welfare/effects on others might be more important than parental desire.)
(5) Great equanimity. If the guru wants to experience good books and music, not doing so would be preference frustration. And if they don't want that experience, then giving it to them seems neutral to me (e.g. consider a monk who would be as peaceful at a raging party as in quiet contemplation, no preference for either, why go to the trouble of the party?)
Finally, your general support for "your right to pursue your own sense of the Good" seems to align really well with anti-frustrationism, which says that whatever you prefer is good for you to get, but that giving you new preferences and then satisfying them is neutral. That seems right to me and matches up with how I want people to respect my autonomy (giving me a preference for X and then giving me X just isn't something I want to happen to me, otherwise I'd be pursuing X myself already)
I would say that causing someone to become dependent on a form of pleasure that may not be attainable for them is somewhat unethical, but I find it difficult to imagine that the scenario would crop up too often where I'm telling someone about a play that they would love, whilst also knowing that it is going to be impossible for them to see that play performed. However, if I did find myself in that position, I would certainly have pause to think about the possibility that I might cause them suffering.
With regards to the mediocre art example I would say that opening someone's horizons to great art might result in raising the threshold for what would bring you satisfaction, and now that raised threshold might be difficult to attain on a regular basis, which again, would cause deprivation that wouldn't otherwise exist. Although the application of negative utilitarianism to these scenarios may seem counter-intuitive; there is a very real harm that could potentially be caused.
As a negative utilitarian, I tend to focus on the ethics of procreation and death (particularly the right to die), because the former is the gateway to all suffering, and the latter is the the gateway to the cessation of suffering. The application of negative utilitarianism in these realms is very black and white. If you cause someone to come into existence, then you are the cause of all their suffering. If you prevent someone from dying by suicide, then again, you are the cause of all the suffering that would have been prevented by their death.
In the space in between the very beginning and the ending of life, life is much more a spectrum of grey with a virtually infinite multitude of variables that cannot be foreseen. So we might tell our friend about a great play or artwork with innocuous enough intent, but actually that may end up being the gateway to serious deprivation for them. Or alternatively, it is also possible that it could end up enriching their experience and cause them to be more content in their life.
However, I would argue that if something has the power to bring great positive value to someone's life and enrich their experience, then being consciously deprived of whatever it is could bring them a sense of enrichment is a great harm. To harbour a desire for something is to have a hole that needs to be filled. Being deprived of a minor gratification such as an ice cream cone when one has a craving for it will probably not cause a massive crater in our wellbeing state, and therefore we can have this desire frustrated without it causing our emotional equilibrium to fall off kilter.
However, in the example of people who want to have children; people desire to have children in order to fulfil an innate psychological need for human connection. Therefore if one harboured a desire for children, then being unable to fulfil this desire can have a severely detrimental effect on one's wellbeing. Alternatively, if it happens to be true that having children would have improved our wellbeing state, but we aren't aware of a desire to have children, then the reality of being childless would not have such a significant detrimental effect on one's welfare state, as there would be no conscious feeling of being deprived of something that one desires.
The key thing here is that desire is a liability. It isn't inherently negative; however to harbour a desire and have that desire frustrated is to experience a state of severe deprivation. The larger the desire, the larger the hole that needs to be filled in, in order to allow us to feel content and 'whole'. There's really no such thing as neutrality when it comes to conscious experience; or if there is such a thing, then it occurs only very fleetingly. By our nature as sentient beings, we are constantly being molested by some new desire or need, and we must perforce strive to satisfy that need or desire in order to prevent suffering. If we decide to just sit down and remain immobile, our psychological state wouldn't just flatline in a state of permanent neutral stasis until we got out of the chair. Eventually we will be disturbed by hunger, discomfort in our restless limbs and the need to go to the toilet.
Negative utilitarianism doesn't feel like it actually is a literally correct theory of value, but it does point to what I think is an important truth: humans generally find bad experiences to be stronger and more impactful than good experiences. ( https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 ) For example, relationships that have fewer than five good interactions for every bad one tend to fall apart, and it's really, really hard to make someone feel as good as a simple kick in the crotch feels bad.
Vinding's arguments actually make perfect intuitive sense to me! But I have anhedonia (and have always felt that negative utilitarianism is only appealing to depressed people anyway)
Going by just the bit you quoted, Vinding's argument seems to be basically a denial that people like things?? (Apologies if the full argument alters things.)
I'll admit to not having much experience with negative utilitarianism, but at a more meta level, I've become suspicious of motivations defined by what they are AGAINST rather than what they are FOR. I've noticed this in political movements especially: organizations that are to e.g. promote the welfare of immigrants seem far more strategic and effective than those that were just opposed to Trump's immigration laws.
Concepts like loss aversion and social pressure suggest that some people really are motivated by these ideas - Hank below seems to articulate this perspective well. But I have a feeling that outside of a few people whose brains are just well wired for it, most humans will be happier framing their life around what they are excited about, not about what they are afraid of. It's certainly advice I give to friends who seem to be stuck focused on negativity.
I think the counter-intuitive cases you present are troubling for negative hedonistic utilitarianism, but they seem less threatening for a anti-frustrastionist/negative preference utilitarian.
Ord's Examples:
(1) the gym, besides instrumental gains to health/wellbeing from exercise, many also want to be fit/muscly/etc. and working out gets them what they want. Not going to the gym would frustrate those preferences.
(2) nice food, people like nice food, not buying it would frustrate their preference for good cuisine. If someone only wanted to eat rice and beans, it would seem strange to give them caviar and say you improved their wellbeing imo.
(3) sprint for the bus to make it to the theatre, people want to see the beginning of plays. Not sprinting would frustrate that preference
(4) they read great books and listen to beautiful music, people want to experience quality recreation. Sitting in a silent, all-beige room would frustrate those preferences for fun/beauty.
And your examples:
(1) a play my friend would love, but that she otherwise wouldn’t have learned about. Assuming my friend likes to watch great plays, not telling her would frustrate her preferences. If she doesn't already want to see plays, then I don't think its counterintuitive not to tell her instead of suggesting recreation she already wants.
(2) Content with mediocre art until showed a piece of much, much more beautiful art. This might be a counter-example, assuming the former-mediocre-art-enjoyer had no preference for finer art until showed it. But it doesn't feel that counter-intuitive to me to say that a person whose content with their current tastes and would be discontent if you gave them higher tastes wouldn't benefit from getting higher tastes. And if they themselves wanted to become an art snob, not getting to do so would frustrate their preference.
(3) Status-seeker should go on a Napa Valley wine-tasting tour and wine-enjoyer shouldn’t. If the wine-enjoyer wants to go on the wine-tasting tour and the status-seeker doesn't, then the wine-enjoyer should go. if the preferences are reversed/status-seeker prefers to go more than wine-enjoyer, I think I endorse that the status-seeker should go instead.
(4) Children. If you want children, not having them would be preference frustration (although the consideration of the kid's welfare/effects on others might be more important than parental desire.)
(5) Great equanimity. If the guru wants to experience good books and music, not doing so would be preference frustration. And if they don't want that experience, then giving it to them seems neutral to me (e.g. consider a monk who would be as peaceful at a raging party as in quiet contemplation, no preference for either, why go to the trouble of the party?)
Finally, your general support for "your right to pursue your own sense of the Good" seems to align really well with anti-frustrationism, which says that whatever you prefer is good for you to get, but that giving you new preferences and then satisfying them is neutral. That seems right to me and matches up with how I want people to respect my autonomy (giving me a preference for X and then giving me X just isn't something I want to happen to me, otherwise I'd be pursuing X myself already)
I would say that causing someone to become dependent on a form of pleasure that may not be attainable for them is somewhat unethical, but I find it difficult to imagine that the scenario would crop up too often where I'm telling someone about a play that they would love, whilst also knowing that it is going to be impossible for them to see that play performed. However, if I did find myself in that position, I would certainly have pause to think about the possibility that I might cause them suffering.
With regards to the mediocre art example I would say that opening someone's horizons to great art might result in raising the threshold for what would bring you satisfaction, and now that raised threshold might be difficult to attain on a regular basis, which again, would cause deprivation that wouldn't otherwise exist. Although the application of negative utilitarianism to these scenarios may seem counter-intuitive; there is a very real harm that could potentially be caused.
As a negative utilitarian, I tend to focus on the ethics of procreation and death (particularly the right to die), because the former is the gateway to all suffering, and the latter is the the gateway to the cessation of suffering. The application of negative utilitarianism in these realms is very black and white. If you cause someone to come into existence, then you are the cause of all their suffering. If you prevent someone from dying by suicide, then again, you are the cause of all the suffering that would have been prevented by their death.
In the space in between the very beginning and the ending of life, life is much more a spectrum of grey with a virtually infinite multitude of variables that cannot be foreseen. So we might tell our friend about a great play or artwork with innocuous enough intent, but actually that may end up being the gateway to serious deprivation for them. Or alternatively, it is also possible that it could end up enriching their experience and cause them to be more content in their life.
However, I would argue that if something has the power to bring great positive value to someone's life and enrich their experience, then being consciously deprived of whatever it is could bring them a sense of enrichment is a great harm. To harbour a desire for something is to have a hole that needs to be filled. Being deprived of a minor gratification such as an ice cream cone when one has a craving for it will probably not cause a massive crater in our wellbeing state, and therefore we can have this desire frustrated without it causing our emotional equilibrium to fall off kilter.
However, in the example of people who want to have children; people desire to have children in order to fulfil an innate psychological need for human connection. Therefore if one harboured a desire for children, then being unable to fulfil this desire can have a severely detrimental effect on one's wellbeing. Alternatively, if it happens to be true that having children would have improved our wellbeing state, but we aren't aware of a desire to have children, then the reality of being childless would not have such a significant detrimental effect on one's welfare state, as there would be no conscious feeling of being deprived of something that one desires.
The key thing here is that desire is a liability. It isn't inherently negative; however to harbour a desire and have that desire frustrated is to experience a state of severe deprivation. The larger the desire, the larger the hole that needs to be filled in, in order to allow us to feel content and 'whole'. There's really no such thing as neutrality when it comes to conscious experience; or if there is such a thing, then it occurs only very fleetingly. By our nature as sentient beings, we are constantly being molested by some new desire or need, and we must perforce strive to satisfy that need or desire in order to prevent suffering. If we decide to just sit down and remain immobile, our psychological state wouldn't just flatline in a state of permanent neutral stasis until we got out of the chair. Eventually we will be disturbed by hunger, discomfort in our restless limbs and the need to go to the toilet.
Negative utilitarianism doesn't feel like it actually is a literally correct theory of value, but it does point to what I think is an important truth: humans generally find bad experiences to be stronger and more impactful than good experiences. ( https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 ) For example, relationships that have fewer than five good interactions for every bad one tend to fall apart, and it's really, really hard to make someone feel as good as a simple kick in the crotch feels bad.
Vinding's arguments actually make perfect intuitive sense to me! But I have anhedonia (and have always felt that negative utilitarianism is only appealing to depressed people anyway)
Going by just the bit you quoted, Vinding's argument seems to be basically a denial that people like things?? (Apologies if the full argument alters things.)